e growing adoption of distributed data processing frameworks in a wide diversity of application domains challenges end-to-end integration of properties like security, in particular when considering deployments in the context of large-scale clusters or multi-tenant Cloud infrastructures.
INTRODUCTION
e data deluge imposed by a world of ever-connected devices, whose most emblematic example is the Internet of ings (IoT), has fostered the emergence of novel data analytics and processing technologies to cope with the ever increasing volume, velocity, and variety of information that characterize the big data era. In particular, to support the continuous ow of information gathered Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. by millions of IoT devices, data streams have emerged as a suitable paradigm to process ows of data at scale. However, as some of these data streams may convey sensitive information, stream processing requires support for end-to-end security guarantees in order to prevent third parties accessing restricted data.
is paper therefore introduces S S , our initial work on a middleware framework for developing and deploying secure stream processing on untrusted distributed environments. S S supports the implementation, deployment, and execution of stream processing tasks in distributed se ings, from large-scale clusters to multi-tenant Cloud infrastructures. More speci cally, S S adopts a message-oriented [28] middleware, which integrates with the SSL protocol [30] for data communication and the current version of Intel®'s so ware guard extensions (SGX) [27] to deliver end-to-end security guarantees along data stream processing stages. S S can scale vertically and horizontally by adding or removing processing nodes at any stage of the pipeline, for example to dynamically adjust according to the current workload.
e design of the S S system is inspired by the data ow programming paradigm [48] : the developer combines together several independent processing components (e.g., mappers, reducers, sinks, shu ers, joiners) to compose speci c processing pipes. Regarding packaging and deployment, S S smoothly integrates with industrial-grade lightweight virtualization technologies like Docker [9] .
In this paper, we propose the following contributions: (i) we describe the design of S S , (ii) we provide details of our reference implementation, in particular on how to smoothly integrate our runtime inside an SGX enclave, and (iii) we perform an extensive evaluation with micro-benchmarks, as well as with a real-world dataset.
e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To be er understand the design of S S , Section 2 delivers a brief introduction to today's SGX operating mechanisms.
e architecture of S S is then introduced in Section 3. Our implementation choices and an example of a S S program are reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our extensive evaluation, presenting a detailed analysis of micro-benchmark performances, as well as more comprehensive macro-benchmarks with real-world datasets. Some related works to this topic are gathered in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 brie y describes our future work and concludes. 
SGX LIGHTNING TOUR
e design of S S revolves around the availability of SGX features in the host machines. It consists in a trusted execution environment (TEE) recently introduced into Intel® SkyLake, similar in spirit to ARM T Z [2] but much more powerful. Applications create secure enclaves to protect the integrity and the con dentiality of the data and the code being executed.
e SGX mechanism, as depicted in Figure 1 , allows applications to access con dential data from inside the enclave. e architecture guarantees that an a acker with physical access to a machine will not be able to tamper with the application data without being noticed. e CPU package represents the security boundary. Moreover, data belonging to an enclave is automatically encrypted and authenticated when stored in main memory. A memory dump on a victim's machine will produce encrypted data. A remote a estation protocol allows one to verify that an enclave runs on a genuine Intel® processor with SGX. An application using enclaves must ship a signed (not encrypted) shared library (a shared object le in Linux) that can possibly be inspected by malicious a ackers.
In the current version of SGX, the enclave page cache (EPC) is a 128 MB area of memory 1 prede ned at boot to store enclaved code and data. At most around 90 MB can be used by application's memory pages, while the remaining area is used to maintain SGX metadata. Any access to an enclave page that does not reside in the EPC triggers a page fault. e SGX driver interacts with the CPU to choose which pages to evict. e tra c between the CPU and the system memory is kept con dential by the memory encryption engine (MEE) [31] , also in charge of tamper resistance and replay protection. If a cache miss hits a protected region, the MEE encrypts or decrypts data before sending to, respectively fetching from, the system memory and performs integrity checks. Data can also be persisted on stable storage protected by a seal key. is allows the storage of certi cates, waiving the need of a new remote a estation every time an enclave application restarts.
e execution ow of a program using SGX enclaves is like the following. First, an enclave is created (see Figure 1-) . As soon as a program needs to execute a trusted function (), it executes SGX's primitive ecall (). e call goes through the SGX call gate 1 Future releases of SGX might relax this limitation [37] .
to bring the execution ow inside the enclave (). Once the trusted function is executed by one of the enclave's threads (), its result is encrypted and sent back () before giving back the control to the main processing thread ().
ARCHITECTURE
e architecture of S S comprises a combination of two di erent types of base components: worker and router. A worker component continuously listens for incoming data by means of non-blocking I/O. As soon as data ows in, an applicationdependent business logic is applied. A typical use-case is the deployment of a classic lter/map/reduce pa ern from the functional programming paradigm [24] . In such a case, worker nodes execute only one function, namely map, filter, or reduce. A router component acts as a message broker between workers in the pipeline and transfers data between them according to a given dispatching policy. Figure 2 depicts a possible implementation of this data ow pa ern using the S S middleware. S S is designed to support the processing of sensitive data inside SGX enclaves. As explained in the previous section, the enclave page cache (EPC) is currently limited to 128 MB. To overcome this limitation, we se led on a lightweight yet e cient embeddable runtime, based on the L virtual machine (L VM) [32] and the corresponding multi-paradigm scripting language [15] . e L runtime requires only few kilobytes of memory, it is designed to be embeddable, and as such it represents an ideal candidate to execute in the limited space allowed by the EPC. Moreover, the application-speci c functions can be quickly prototyped in L , and even complex algorithms can be implemented with an almost 1:1 mapping from pseudo-code [35] . We provide further implementation details of the embedding of the L VM inside an SGX enclave in Section 4.
Each component is wrapped inside a lightweight Linux container (in our case, the de facto industrial standard Docker [9]). Each container embeds all the required dependencies, while guaranteeing the correctness of their con guration, within an isolated and reproducible execution environment. By doing so, a S S processing pipeline can be easily deployed without changing the source code on di erent public or private infrastructures. For instance, this will allow developers to deploy S S to Amazon EC2 container service [1] , where SkyLake-enabled instances will soon be made available [4] , or similarly to Google compute engine [12] . e deployment of the containers can be transparently executed on a single machine or a cluster, using a Docker network and the Docker Swarm scheduler [11] .
e communication between workers and routers leverages Z MQ, a high-performance asynchronous messaging library [21] . Each router component hosts inbound and outbound queues. In particular, the routers use the Z MQ's pipeline pa ern [22] with the P -P socket types. e inbound queue is a P socket. e messages are streamed from a set of anonymous 2 P peers (e.g., the upstream workers in the pipeline). e inbound queue uses a fair-queuing scheduling to deliver the message to the upper layer. Conversely, the outbound Figure 2 : Example of S S pipeline architecture.
queue is a P socket, sending messages using a round-robin algorithm to a set of anonymous P peers-e.g., the downstream workers.
is design allows us to dynamically scale up and down each stage of the pipeline in order to adapt it to application's needs or the workload. Finally, Z MQ guarantees that the messages are delivered across each stage via reliable TCP channels.
We de ne the processing pipeline components and their chaining by means of Docker's Compose [10] description language. Listing 1 reports on a snippet of the description used to deploy the architecture in Figure 2 . Once the processing pipeline is dened, the containers must be deployed on the computing infrastructure. We exploit the constraint placement mechanisms to enforce the Docker Swarm's scheduler in order to deploy workers requiring SGX capabilities into appropriate hosts. In the example, an sgx mapper nodes is deployed on an SGX host by specifying constraint:type==sgx in the Compose description. 
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
). e implementation of the middleware itself requires careful engineering, especially with respect to the integration in the SGX enclaves (explained later). However, a S S use-case can be implemented in remarkably few lines of code. For instance, the implementation of the map/ lter/reduce accounts for only 120 lines of code (without counting the dependencies). e framework partially extends R L [17] , a library for reactive programming in L . R L provides to the developer the required API to design a data stream processing pipeline following a data ow programming pa ern [48] .
Listing 2 provides an example of a R L program (and consequently a S S program) to compute the average age of a population by chaining :map, :filter, and :reduce functions. 3 e :subscribe function performs the subscription of 3 functions to the data stream. Following the observer design pa ern [46] , these functions are observers, while the data stream is an observable. Listing 2: Example of process pipeline with RxLua.
S
S dynamically ships the business logic for each component into a dedicated Docker container and executes it. e communication between the Docker containers (the router and the worker components) happens through Z MQ (v4.1.2) and the corresponding L bindings [16] . Basically, S S abstracts the underlying network and computing infrastructure from the developer, by relying on Z MQ and Docker. Under the SGX threat model where the system so ware is completely untrusted, system calls are not allowed inside secure enclaves. As a consequence, porting a legacy application or runtime, such as the L interpreter, is challenging. To achieve this task, we traced all system calls made by the interpreter to the standard C library and replaced them by alternative implementations that either mimic the real behavior or discard the call. Our changes to the vanilla L source code consist of the addition of about 600 lines of code, or 2.5 % of its total size. By doing so, L programs operating on les, network sockets or any other input/output device do not execute as they normally do outside the enclaves. is inherent SGX limitation also reinforces the system security guarantees o ered to the application developers. e S S framework safely ships the data and code to enclaves. Hence, the L scripts executed within the SGX enclave do not use (read/write) les or sockets. Wrapper functions are nevertheless installed in the SGX-enabled L VM to prevent any of such a empts.
An additional constraint imposed by the secure SGX enclaves is the impossibility of dynamically linking code. e reason is that the assurance that a given code is running inside a SGX-enabled processor is made through the measurement of its content when the enclave is created. More speci cally, this measurement is the result of EREPORT instruction, an SGX-speci c report that computes a cryptographically secure hash of code, data and a few data structures, which overall builds a snapshot of the state of the enclave (including threads, memory heap size, etc.) and the processor (security version numbers, keys, etc.). Allowing more code to be linked dynamically at runtime would break the assurance given by the a estation mechanism on the integrity of the code being executed, allowing for example an a acker to load a malicious library inside the enclave. In the case of L , a direct consequence is the impossibility of loading L extensions using the traditional dynamic linking technique. Every extension has to be statically compiled and packed with the enclave code. To ease the development of S S applications, we statically compiled json [3] , and csv [43] parsers within our enclaved L interpreter. With these libraries, the size of the VM and the complete runtime still remains reasonably small, approximately 220 KB (19 % larger than the original).
While this restricted L has been adapted to run inside SGX enclaves, we still had to provide a support for communications and the reactive streams framework itself. To do so, we use an external vanilla L interpreter, with a couple adaptations that allowed the interaction with the SGX enclaves and the L VM therein. Figure 3 shows the resulting architecture. We extend the L interface with 3 functions: sgxprocess, sgxencrypt, and sgxdecrypt. e rst one forwards the encrypted code and data to be processed in the enclave, while the remaining two provide cryptographic functionalities. In this work, we assume that a estation and key establishment was previously performed. As a result, keys safely reside within the enclave. We plan to release our implementation as open-source. 4 
EVALUATION
is section reports on our extensive evaluation of S S . First, we present our evaluation se ings.
en, we describe the real-world dataset used in our macro-benchmark experiments. We then dig into a set of micro-benchmarks that evaluate the overhead of running the L VM inside the SGX enclaves. Finally, we deploy a full S S pipeline, scaling the number of workers per stage, to study the limits of the system in terms of throughput and scalability.
Evaluation Settings
We have experimented on machines using a Intel® Core™ i7-6700 processor [14] 
Input Dataset
In our experiments, we process a real-world dataset released by the American Bureau of Transportation Statistics [19] . e dataset reports on the ight departures and arrivals of 20 air carriers [8] . We implement a benchmark application atop of S S to compute average delays and the total of delayed ights for each air carrier (cf. Table 1 ). We design and implement the full processing pipeline, that (i) parses the input datasets (in a comma-separatedvalue format) to data structure (map), (ii) lters data by relevancy (i.e., if the data concerns a delayed ight), and (iii) nally reduces it to compute the desired information. 5 We use the 4 last years of the available dataset (from 2005 to 2008), for a total of 28 millions of entries to process and 2.73 GB of data.
Micro-Benchmark: L in SGX
We begin our evaluation with a set of micro-benchmarks to evaluate performance of the integration of the L VM inside the SGX enclaves. First, we estimate the cost of execution for functions inside the enclave. is test averages the execution time of 1 million function calls, without any data transfer. We compare against the same result without SGX. While non-enclaved function calls took 23.6 ns, the performances inside the enclave drop down to on average 2.35 s-i.e., approximately two orders of magnitude worse. We then assess the cost of copying data from the unshielded execution to the enclave and we compare it with the time required to compute the same on the native system. We initialize a bu er of 100 MB with random data and copy its content inside the enclave. e data is split into chunks of increasing sizes. Our test executes one function call to transfer each chunk, until all data is transfered. Each point in the plot corresponds to the average of 20 runs. Correctness of the copies was veri ed by SHA256 digest comparison between reproduced memory areas. Figure 4 shows the results for 4 di erent variants, comparing the native and the SGX version to only copy the data inside the enclave (in) or to copy it inside and copying it back (in/out). When using smaller chunks, the function call overhead plays an important role in the total execution time. Moreover, we notice that the call overhead steadily drops until the chunk size reaches the size of 5 is experiment is inspired by Kevin Webber's blog entry diving into Akka streams: h ps://blog.redelastic.com/diving-into-akka-streams-2770b3aeabb0. 64 KB (vertical line). We can also notice that copying data back to non-SGX execution imposes an overhead of at most 20 % when compared to the one-way copy. ese initial results are used as guidelines to drive the con guration of the streaming pipeline, in particular with respect to the size of the chunks exchanged between the processing stages. e larger the chunks, the smaller the overhead induced by the transfer of data within the SGX enclave.
Once the data and the code are copied inside the enclave, the L VM must indeed execute the code before returning the control. Hence, we evaluate here the raw performances of the enclaved SGX L VM. We select 6 available benchmarks from a standard suite of tests [25] . We based this choice on their library dependencies (by selecting the most standalone ones) and the number of input/output instructions they execute (selecting those with the fewest I/O). Each benchmark runs 20 times with the same pair of parameters of the original paper, shown in the even and odd lines of Table 2 . Figure 5 depicts the total time (average and standard deviation) required to complete the execution of the 6 benchmarks. We use a bar chart plot, where we compare the results of the Native and SGX modes. For each of the 6 benchmarks, we present two bars next to each other (one per executing mode) to indicate the di erent con guration parameters used. Finally, for the sake of readability, we use a di erent y-axis scale for the binarytrees case (from 0 to 400 s), on the right-side of the gure.
We note that, in the current version of SGX, it is required to pre-allocate all the memory area to be used by the enclave. e most memory-eager test (binarytrees) used more than 600 MB of memory, hence using the wall clock time comparison would not be fair for smaller tests. In such cases, almost the whole execution time is dedicated to memory allocation. Because of that, we subtracted the allocation time from the measurements of enclave executions, based on the average for the 20 runs. Fluctuations on this measurement produced slight variations in the execution times, sometimes producing the unexpected result of having SGX executions faster than native ones (by at most 3 %). Table 2 lists the parameters along with the maximum amount of memory used and the ratio between runtimes of SGX and Native executions. When the memory usage is low, the ratio between the Native and SGX versions is small-e.g., less than 15 % in our experiments. However, when the amount of memory usage increases, performance drops to almost 5× worse, as re ected in the case of the binarytrees experiment. e smaller the memory usage, the be er performance we can obtain from SGX enclaves.
Synthesis. To conclude this series of micro-benchmarks, taming the overhead of secured executions based on SGX requires balancing the size of the chunks transfered to the enclave with the memory usage within this enclave. In the context of stream processing systems, S S therefore uses reactive programming principles to balance the load within processing stages in order to minimize the execution overhead.
Benchmark: Streaming roughput
e previous set of experiments allowed us to verify that our design, implementation, and the integration of the L VM into the SGX enclaves is sound. Next, we deploy a S S pipeline which includes mappers, lters and reducers. To measure the achievable throughput of our system, as well the network overhead of our architecture, we deploy the S S pipeline in 3 di erent con gurations. In each case, the setup of the pipeline architecture, i.e. the creation of the set of containers, has been done in 11 s for the lightest con guration, in 15 s for the heaviest one. e rst con guration allows the streaming framework to blindly bypass the SGX enclaves. Further, it does not encrypt the input dataset before injecting it into the pipeline.
is mode operates as the baseline, yet completely unsafe, processing pipeline. e second mode encrypts the dataset but lets the encrypted packets skip the SGX enclaves. is con guration requires the deployers to trust the infrastructure operator. Finally, we deploy a fully secure pipeline, where the input dataset is encrypted and the data processing is operated inside the enclaves. e data nodes inject the dataset, split into 4 equally-sized parts, as fast as possible. We gather bandwidth measurements by exploiting Docker's internal monitoring and statistical module.
e results of these deployments are presented in Figure 6 . For each of the mentioned con gurations, we also vary the number of workers per stage, from one ( Figure 6-a,d,g ), two ( Figure 6-b,e,h ), or four (the remaining ones.) We use a representation based on stacked percentiles. e white bar at the bo om represents the minimum value, the pale grey on top the maximal value. Intermediate shades of grey represent the 25th-, 50th-, and 75th-percentiles. For instance, in Figure 6 -a (our baseline) the median throughput at 200 s into the experiment almost hits 7.5 MB/s, meaning that 50 % of the nodes in that moment are outpu ing data at 7.5 MB/s or less. e baseline con guration, with only 1 worker per stage, completes in 420 s, with a peak of 12 MB/s. By doubling the number of workers reduces the processing time down to 250 s (Figure 6-d) , a speed-up of 41 %. Scaling up the workers to 4 in the baseline con guration (Figure 6-g ) did not produce a similar speed-up.
As we start injecting encrypted datasets ( Figure 6 -b and followup con gurations with 2 and 4 workers), the processing time almost doubles (795 s).
e processing of the dataset is done a er the messages are decrypted. We also pay a penalty in terms of overall throughput-i.e., the median value rarely exceeds 5 MB/s. On the other hand, now we observe substantial speed-ups when increasing the workers per stage, down to 430 s and 300 s with 2 and 4 workers, respectively. e deployment of the most secure set of con gurations (rightmost column of plots in Figure 6 ) shows that when using encrypted datasets and executing the stream processing inside SGX enclaves one must expect longer processing times and lower throughputs.
is is the (expected) price to pay for higher-security guarantees across the full processing pipeline. Nevertheless, one can observe that the more workers the less penalty is imposed by the end-to-end security guarantees provided by S S .
Benchmark: Workers' Scalability
To conclude our evaluation, we study S S in terms of scalability. We consider a pipeline scenario similar to Figure 2 with some variations in the number of workers deployed for each stage. We do so to be er understand to what extents the underlying container scheduling system can exploit the hardware resources at its disposal.
First, we increase the number of workers for each stage of the pipeline, from 1 to 4. For each of the con gurations, the experiment is repeated 5 times. We present average and standard deviation of the total completion time to process the full dataset in Figure 7 . As expected, we observe ideal speed-up from a con guration using roughput comparison between normal processing (with cleartext data and no encryption), encrypted data but without enclaves, and with encrypted data and SGX processing. We scale the number of worker nodes per stage from 1 (lemost column), 2 (center colum) and 4 (right-most column). 1 worker to that using 2 workers. However, in the con guration using 4 workers by stage, we do not reach the same acceleration. We explain this because, in this la er case, the number of deployed containers (which equals the sum of input data streams, workers, and routers, hence 20 containers) is greater than the number of physical cores of the hosts (8 for each of the 2 hosts used in our deployment-i.e., 16 cores on our evaluation cluster).
We also study the total completion time while increasing only the number of mapper workers in the rst stage of the pipeline (which we identi ed as the one consuming most resources) from 1 to 16 and maintaining the numbers of lters and reducers in the following stages constant. As in the previous benchmark, the experiment is repeated 5 times for each con guration and we measure the average and standard deviation of the total completion time. Figure 8 presents the results. Here again, we observe ideal speedup until the number of deployed containers reaches the number of physical cores. Beyond this number, we do not observe further improvements. ese two experiments clearly show that the scalability of S S according the number of deployed workers across the cluster is primarily limited by the total number of physical cores available.
Apart from this scalability limitation, there are other factors that reduce the observed streaming throughput, with or without involving the SGX enclaves. For instance, our throughout experiments highlight that the system does not manage to saturate the available network bandwidth in all cases. We believe this behaviour can be explained by the lack of optimizations in the application logic as well as possible tuning options of the inner Z MQ queues. As part of our future work, we therefore plan to further investigate these e ects and to build on this knowledge to only scale the appropriate workers in order to maximize the overall speed-up of the deployed application. In particular, we intend to leverage the elasticity of workers at runtime in order to cope with the memory constraints imposed by SGX and the con guration of the underlying hardware architecture, for each of the available nodes, in order to o er the best performances for secured execution of data stream processing applications built atop of S S .
RELATED WORK
Spark [50] has recently gained a lot of traction as prominent solution to implement e cient stream processing. It leverages Resilient Distributed Datasets (RDD) to provide a uniform view on the data to process. Despite its popularity, Spark only handles unencrypted data and hence does not o er security guarantees. Recent proposals [44] study possible so ware solutions to overcome this limitation. Several big industrial players introduced their own stream processing solutions. ese systems are mainly used to ingest massive amounts of data and e ciently perform (real-time) analytics. Twi er's Heron [34] , and Google's Cloud DataFlow [23] are two prominent examples. ese systems are typically deployed on the provider's premises and are not o ered as a service to end-users.
A few dedicated solutions exist today for distributed stream processing using reactive programming. For instance, R K [18] allows stream processing atop of Apache K [5, 33] .
ese solutions do not, however, support secure execution in a trusted execution environment.
More recently, some open-source middleware frameworks (e.g., Apache S [20] , Apache S [6] , I
[13]) introduced APIs to allow developers to quickly set up and deploy stream processing infrastructures.
ese systems rely on the Java virtual machine (JVM) [36] . However, SGX currently imposes a hard memory limit of 128 MB to the enclaved code and data, at the cost of expensive encrypted memory paging mechanisms and serious performance overheads [26, 41] when this limit is crossed. Moreover, executing a fully-functional JVM inside an SGX enclave would currently involve signi cant re-engineering e orts.
DEFC [38] relies also on the JVM. is event processing system focuses on security by enforcing constraints on event ows between processing units. e event ow control is enforced using application-level virtualisation to separate processing units in a ad-hoc JVM.
A few recent contributions tackle privacy-preserving data processing, particularly in a MapReduce scenario. is is the case of Airavat [42] and G [39] . ese systems leverage di erentialprivacy techniques [29] and can face a di erent threat model than the one supported by SGX and hence by S S . In particular, when deploying such systems on a public infrastructure, one needs to trust the cloud provider. Our system greatly reduces the trust boundaries, and only requires trust of Intel® and their SGX implementation.
Some authors contest that public clouds may be secure enough some parts of an application. ey propose to split the jobs, running only the critical parts in private clouds. A privacy-aware framework on hybrid clouds [49] has been proposed to work on tagged data, at di erent granularity levels. A MapReduce preprocessor splits data into private and public clouds according to their sensitivity. Sedic [51] does not o er the same tagging granularity, but proposes to automatically modify reducers to optimize the data transfers in a hybrid cloud. ese solutions require spli ing application and data in two parts (sensitive and not) and impose higher latencies due to data transfers between two di erent clouds. Yet, they cannot o er be er security guarantees that the so ware stack itself o ers, be it public or private.
MrCrypt [47] proposes using homomorphic encryption instead of trusted elements.
rough static code analysis, it pinpoints di erent homomorphic encryption schemes for every data column. Still, some of the demonstrated benchmarks are ten times slower than the unecrypted execution. S S avoids of complex encryption schemes, decrypts data entering enclaves and processes in plaintext.
e S [45] system uses partial homorphic encryption to allow for e cient stream processing in trusted cloud environments. Interestingly, the authors of that system mention Intel® SGX as possible alternative to deploy stream processing systems on trusted hardware o ered by untrusted/malicious cloud environments. S S o ers insights on the performances of exactly this approach.
To best of our knowledge, S S is the rst lightweight and low-memory footprint stream processing framework that can fully execute within SGX enclaves. As we described before, S S is executing processes taking advantage of SGX enclaves inside Docker containers. SCONE [40] , which is not yet openly available, is a recently introduced system that o ers a secure container mechanism for Docker to leverage the SGX trusted execution support. It proposes a generic technology to embed any C program to execute inside an SGX enclave. Rather than generic programs, S S o ers support to execute a lightweight L VM inside an SGX enclave and securely execute chunks of L code inside it. In our experiments, we execute this L VM inside Docker containers.
CONCLUSION
Secure stream processing is becoming a major concern in the era of the Internet of ings and big data. is paper introduces our design and evaluation of S S , an concise and e cient middleware framework to implement, deploy and evaluate secure stream processing pipelines for continuous data streams. e framework is designed to exploit the SGX trusted execution environments readily available in Intel®'s commodity processors, such as the latest SkyLake. We implemented the prototype of S S in L and based its APIs on the reactive programming approach. Our initial evaluation results based on real-world traces are encouraging, and pave the way for deployment of stream processing systems over sensitive data on untrusted public clouds.
We plan in our future work to further extend and thoroughly evaluate S S against other known approaches on secure stream processing, like S [45] , MrCrypt [47] or DEFC [38] . In particular, we plan to extend S S with full automation of container deployments, as well as enriching the framework with a library of standard stream processing operators and e cient yet secure native plugins, to ease the development of complex stream processing pipelines.
